Party discipline and pork barrel politics

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National Bureau of Economic Research , Cambridge, MA
Party discipline., Fiscal policy., Government spending po
StatementGene M. Grossman, Elhanan Helpman.
SeriesNBER working paper series ;, working paper 11396, Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;, working paper no. 11396.
ContributionsHelpman, Elhanan., National Bureau of Economic Research.
Classifications
LC ClassificationsHB1
The Physical Object
FormatElectronic resource
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL3478239M
LC Control Number2005618233

Party discipline and pork-barrel politics. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, © (OCoLC) Material Type: Internet resource: Document Type: Book, Internet Resource: All Authors / Contributors: Gene M Grossman; Elhanan Helpman; National Bureau of Economic Research.

Party Discipline and Pork Barrel Politics. Get this from a library. Party discipline and pork-barrel politics. [Gene M Grossman; Elhanan Helpman; National Bureau of Economic Research.] -- "Polities differ in the extent to which political parties can pre-commit to carry out promised policy actions if they take power.

Commitment problems may arise due to a divergence between the ex ante. Party Discipline and Pork-barrel Politics. The article aims to Party discipline and pork barrel politics book to the research on MPs’ or ministry grants, generally known as pork barrel, by study of spatial differentiation of the Ministry of Regional Development program of.

In particular, we examine the determinants of national spending on local public goods in a three-stage game of campaign rhetoric, voting, and legislative decision-making.

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We find that the rhetoric and reality of pork-barrel spending, and also the efficiency of the spending regime, bear a non-monotonic relationship to the degree of party discipline. party discipline pork-barrel politics commitment problem di erences ex ante incentive three-stage game promised policy action ex post incentive non-monotonic relationship legislative decision-making local public good national party campaign rhetoric spending regime national spending political party individual legislator pork-barrel spending.

We find that the rhetoric and reality of pork-barrel spending, and also the efficiency of the spending regime, bear a non-monotonic relationship to the degree of party discipline. Polities differ in the extent to which political parties can pre-commit to carry out promised policy actions if they take power.

party discipline pork-barrel politics commitment problem ex ante incentive three-stage game promised policy action ex post incentive non-monotonic relationship legislative decision-making local public good national party campaign rhetoric spending regime national spending political party individual legislator pork-barrel spending.

It is the first book to develop and test a micro-level theory of internal party politics in parliaments using roll-call data from several parliaments. If Kam is right, that parliamentary parties are no-longer unitary actors and that party cohesion is fragile and conditional, this calls into question much of the established wisdom about how Cited by: ically different.

Thai leaders are party-oriented and have shifted away from the pork-barrel politics of the past. Japanese leaders and members of parliament remain candidate-oriented and continue Japan’s pork-barrel policies. We explain these divergent outcomes by analyzing the different causes of and politics surrounding the electoral.

Pork barrel politics has been present in the United States' legislative and, to a lesser degree, executive branches since the s. Generally used in a derogatory manner, the term refers to the.

Party Discipline and Pork Barrel Politics Gene M. Grossman, Elhanan Helpman. NBER Working Paper No. Issued in June NBER Program(s):International Finance and Macroeconomics, International Trade and Investment, Public Economics, Political Economy Polities differ in the extent to which political parties can pre-commit to carry out promised.

Pork-barrel politics describes a process that legislators use to obtain funding from a central government to finance projects benefiting the legislators' local constituents.

Description Party discipline and pork barrel politics EPUB

The benefits of such Author: Will Kenton. the extent of party discipline. We refer to these respectively as the rhetoric and reality of pork-barrel policy.

Then, in Section 4, we study how the announcements and policies vary with the political environment. We also examine the relationship between ex ante expected welfare and the degree of party discipline.

Section 5 concludes. Although little is known about how party systems influence opportunities for pork‐ barrel politics, I extract useful insights from the literature on party discipline and apply them in order to understand and compare distributive politics in both the dominant‐party systemsCited by: 4.

Abstract. This paper studies the impacts of party discipline on allocation of scarce federal resources among national districts. In particular, I model the distribution of government spending within a two-party legislature as an asymmetric contest game between congress members, in which the majority party has a relative advantage in directing pork barrel into its partisan Cited by: 1.

Party Discipline and Pork Barrel Politics. By Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman. Download PDF ( KB) Abstract. Polities differ in the extent to which political parties can pre-commit to carry out promised policy actions if they take power.

Commitment problems may arise due to a divergence between the ex ante incentives facing national Author: Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman. Party Discipline and Pork-Barrel Politics. By Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman.

Download PDF ( KB) Abstract. Polities differ in the extent to which political parties can pre-commit to carry out promised policy actions if they take power. Commitment problems may arise due to a divergence between the ex ante incentives facing national Author: Gene M.

Grossman and Elhanan Helpman. The book combines extensive use of new sources of data, ranging from historical and demographic analysis in focused comparisons of individual states to unique sources of data for the exploration of. Introduction. Party discipline commonly refers to the ability of party leaders to influence their party members to support the party line on the floor of the legislature.

1 In modern democracies, party discipline is often difficult to achieve because legislators have to respond to local needs and preferences that are sometimes not aligned with the party's : Marta Curto-Grau, Galina Zudenkova.

"Party Discipline and Pork-Barrel Politics," in E. Helpman, ed., Institutions and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Heller, William B., and Carol Mershon, "Dealing in Discipline: Party Switching and Legislative Voting in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, ," American Journal of Political Science, 52, leadership can use to enforce party discipline|as described inGrossman and Helpman ()|thus paving the way for ideology to play a greater role in the political process.

Putting aside any normative concerns, this paper analyzes the link between pork-barrel spending (equivalently, earmarks)|de ned as appropriations secured for theFile Size: 1MB.

The discussion of party discipline in the Chamber of Deputies is the first multivariate model of party cooperation or defection in Latin America that includes measures of such important phenomena as constituency effects, pork-barrel receipts, ideology, electoral insecurity, and intention to seek by:   The discussion of party discipline in the Chamber of Deputies is the first multivariate model of party cooperation or defection in Latin America that includes measures of such important phenomena as constituency effects, pork-barrel receipts, ideology, electoral insecurity, and intention to seek reelection.

The discussion of party discipline in the Chamber of Deputies is the first multivariate model of party cooperation or defection in Latin America that includes measures of such important phenomena as constituency effects, pork-barrel receipts, ideology, electoral insecurity, and intention to seek reelection.

Party Discipline and Pork-Barrel Politics. ” Working paper, Princeton University. Inman. Robert P. ( Cited by:   The article's central argument is that a strong correlation exists between the number of representatives per district and the degree of pork barrel politics.

Factors such as committee structure and party discipline are also by: Pork Barrel. the mighty list of federal projects, grants, and contracts available to cities, businesses, colleges, and institutions available in a congressional district Party Discipline.

The American Political System - Chapter 1 26 Terms. straherom. The American Political System - Chapter 2 17 Terms. Party Discipline and Pork-Barrel Politics [Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman] 9.

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Policy Persistence in Multi-Party Parliamentary Democracies [Daniel Diermeier and Pohan Fong] III. Contemporary Evidence. Formalizing Informal Institutions: Theory and Evidence From a Kenyan Slum [Siwan Anderson and Patrick Francois].

The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America (Chicago, IL and London: The University of Chicago Press, ), p; M. Laver and K.A. Shepsle, ‘How Political Parties Emerged from the Primeval Slime: Party Cohesion, Party Discipline, and the Formation of Governments’, in S.

Bowler, D.M. Farrell and R.S. Katz (eds.), Party.This book explores the strategies by which leaders use pork barrel benefits to form majority coalitions and analyzes the im-pact of these strategies on the decisions of the legislators who receive the benefits.

Additionally, to see how the process operates in the real world, the book examines the use of pork barrel benefits to pass a number ofFile Size: KB.by Daniel Y. Kono - American Political Science Review, Agrowing body of research shows that democracies have more liberal trade policies than doautocracies.

I argue, in contrast, that democracy has contradictory effects on different types oftrade policies because electoral competition generates more information about some than about g: pork barrel.